On 16 and 17 April 2013, Member States discussed ways on how to proceed with the intergovernmental negotiations on Security Council reform which continue to be rather slow, repetitive, and contentious.

The chair of the negotiations, Permanent Representative Zahir Tanin of Afghanistan, had hoped to have such a meeting much earlier, at the end of January, but, according to numerous sources, the current President of the General Assembly, Vuk Jeremic, had disagreed.

In July 2012, Tanin had made bold proposals on how to move the process forward. He suggested that:

1) Member States could explore a variety of reform models including expansion in both categories, interim and intermediate options.
2) Member States could task the Chair at the annual decision on Security Council reform to draft a concise working document.
3) In case there would be sufficient progress in the intergovernmental negotiations during the 67th session, a high-level meeting could be held, to assess the state of play and propose ways to keep the process moving forward.

At the meetings held on 16 and 17 April 2013, there was strong opposition to his second and third proposals. The African Group, with Algeria speaking on behalf of the C10, repeated its stance that no streamlining of the negotiation text should take place, although South Africa and Mozambique deviated from the African Group’s position by stating that they agreed with the creation of a concise text by the Chair.

The UfC also stated its opposition to a concise text, as did China, the Russian Federation, and the US. Based on interventions and communications of the last five years, such opposition was to be expected. It was also not surprising that the G4 and L69 groups were in favor as they had been calling for a shorter text for years. The Netherlands and Malaysia apparently joined the G4 and L69 in this regard.

Tanin told the Center recently that in his opinion, a concise document would not necessarily have the problems associated with a "shorter" or "streamlined" text, such as the elimination of positions, or loss of nuances.

As to holding a high-level meeting, there was a feeling in the room that at this stage in the negotiations, the participation of permanent representatives in New York was sufficiently high-level. Calls for a high-level meeting seem to stem from the perception that not enough capitals are actively involved, a notion denied by Egypt at the latest meeting.

The current version of Revision 3 of the compilation/negotiation text apparently also remains challenged, with the African Union and others preferring the second revision.

All in all, it seems abundantly clear that the negotiations remain stuck, though meetings on intermediary/interim models have not been held for a long time. The UfC, Liechtenstein, and the Philippines, have made proposals on compromise models that are reflected in the compilation/negotiation text and no P5 members seem set against such a solution. However, France and the UK see the intermediate solution as a way to convert intermediate seats to permanent seats after a review, something the UfC has not endorsed in the past.

India and the African Group have strongly argued against intermediate proposals during the last five years. Meetings on compromise models are unlikely to lead to significant results as long as the African Group, G4 and L69 believe that they have a real chance of adding permanent seats to an expanded Security Council. In this regard, St Vincent and the Grenadines announced at the meeting that the African Group and L69 now have a common text that is compliant with the Ezulwini Consensus. Interestingly, Egypt noted that it would have been better if CARICOM had consulted the African Group before their draft resolution was finalized. (See www.centerforunreform.org/node/496 for a copy of the resolution.)

Tanin, at the end of the meeting, said that he had heard those who expressed caution about his proposals. He repeated, however, that the negotiations could not move forward without a concrete basis. In a conversation with the Center in early May, he suggested that it might be best to "put the negotiations on strategic hold" when genuine give-and-take negotiations based on a working document would not be likely.

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Notes on key Groups:
African Group: the 54 Member States from Africa. Its position is coordinated by the C10: Algeria, DRC, Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, Libya, Namibia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Uganda, and Zambia. In favor of new permanent seats with veto rights. However, South Africa and Nigeria have been willing to be flexible on veto rights as recently as 2009.
G4: Brazil, Germany, India, Japan: in favor of permanent seats but willing to be flexible on veto rights. It gathered almost 80 supporters in 2012 for a draft resolution on adding permanent members but it did not mention veto rights. Many of the backers for this draft resolution apparently do not support extending the right of veto, or have made their support conditional in other ways. The list of endorsers was not made public but is likely to include members of the L69 and African Group.
L69: India, Brazil, and approximately 40 other Member States, many of them small island states: in favor of permanent seats. Approximately 10 of these are thought to be supporters from Africa. Since 2012, in favor of adding veto rights to new permanent seats.
UfC: Uniting for Consensus, with Italy as focal point. Against new permanent seats. Core members are Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Italy, Malta, Mexico, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, San Marino, Spain, and Turkey. China and Indonesia attend UfC meetings at expert level. Support for its objection to existing models for new permanent seats probably total between 30-40 Member States.