30 January 2013
by Lydia Swart
An update on Security Council reform efforts from July 2012 - 30 January 2013
On 25 July 2012, Amb. Zahir Tanin, Chair of the negotiations on Security Council Reform, wrote a letter to Member States in which he not only outlined the last four years of negotiations, but also made a bold move by making specific recommendations on how to move forward:
"The logical next step, after no less than four General Assembly sessions and eight rounds, would be genuine give and take based on a concise working document. The logical drafter for this document would, in the best UN tradition, be the Chair. … Member States could, through the annual GA decision on Security Council reform task the Chair with drafting said document… Should the Chair see sufficient evidence of progress in the Intergovernmental Negotiations during the 67th session, a high-level meeting on SC reform could be held, to assess the state of play and propose ways to keep the process moving forward."
These proposals - the G4 has called for a shortened text for years - obviously upset the UfC, apparently damaging their confidence that the Chair was genuinely impartial, in particular when he mentioned "majorities" for certain positions taken at the meetings. In the words of one diplomat belonging to the UfC: “Tanin, in his July 2012 letter, did not play right in the middle.”
On 12 September 2012, then PGA Al-Nasser distributed a draft for an oral decision on Security Council reform which referred to Tanin’s role, but did not mention his recommendations:
"..., and noting with with appreciation the active role and the concrete efforts of the Chair of the intergovernmental negotiations, including the preparation of the text reflecting the positions of and proposals submitted by Member States..."
Some countries then lobbied for the specific mention of these recommendations, and the revised oral agreement that was finally adopted at the end of the 66th session, says:
"..., and taking note of the proposals of the Chair of the intergovernmental negotiations, and noting with appreciation his active role and concrete efforts, including the preparation of the text reflecting the positions of and proposals by Member States ..."
Though Tanin’s proposals are mentioned, the fact that the language merely says “taking note” does not sound like a ringing endorsement. Tanin - and/or PGA Vuk Jeremic - must have concluded that he did not have the required support to produce a concise text because his next communication of 4 December 2012 asked Member States to review their positions on Revision 3 of the negotiation text and to contribute proposals to revise it further. Especially the UfC and the African Group have regularly expressed their reservations about Revision 3. More recently, it became public knowledge that P5 members China and Russia have been similarly complaining about the process of negotiations. These communications were made widely available on 17 January 2013, when Tanin distributed them to Member States - a considerable contribution to the transparency of the negotiation process.
The 17 January 2013 letter not only refers to a letter from China of 11 January 2013, but also to two of its previous letters dated 24 January 2011 and 1 February 2011. China states in its letters that Revision 3 “reorganized and summed up the positions and proposals of Member States, which is not only inappropriate and harmful, but also undermines the integrity of positions of Member States.” In its letter of 24 January 2011, China argues that the negotiation texts “may serve as an important reference, but not the basis of intergovernmental negotiations. ... Before the parties concerned reach general consensus on the major issues of principle, streamlining the text will not help bridge their difference, but rather bring about more problems.”
Russia, in a letter of 11 January 2012, also wrote to Tanin, reiterating its position from a letter of 14 February 2011, that the “rev. 3 is, as any possible future version of such a paper must continue to be, a compendium listing approaches of Member States to the Security Council reform. It may serve as a useful reference paper facilitating the participation of Member States in the intergovernmental negotiations, but not the basis for the negotiations.”
No meeting has been scheduled thus far to our knowledge. There will, however, be meetings outside the Intergovernmental Negotiations in Rome in early February 2013 and in Brazil in April 2013.
One of the key questions at this stage is: If the negotiation text is not yet a “real basis for negotiations,” what would a move to "real" negotiations look like? As both the Chair of the negotiations and the President of the General Assembly must be intensely lobbied by opposing factions, guiding the process towards meaningful compromise has to remain an exceedingly difficult task.
Note: The Center is working on an update of "Managing Change at the United Nations," a publication from 2008. The draft of the chapter on Security Council reform is nearly completed and interviews with key players to address remaining questions are being conducted. Experts who wish to add to the Center's knowledge are very welcome to do so by emailing