By Tamara Johnson
24 October 2012
As the Third Committee progresses with its 67th session, here are some hot button issues with which the NGO community and some delegations (the off the record nature of the consultations informing this article prevents specifics) are particularly concerned.
Freedom of Expression and Freedom of Religion and Belief
This promises to be a contentious issue following the recent movie and cartoons considered deeply offensive to Islam and the violence that ensued. There will be two resolutions, one backed the European Union (EU) and one backed by the Organization of the Islamic Cooperation (OIC). Some OIC States, including Egypt and Pakistan, have stated their intention to attempt the introduction of language curtailing freedom of expression in the form of a code of conduct for media expression, as well as anti-defamation language. Other delegations and NGOs are concerned that such language would be employed as a tool for oppression, and they seek to strengthen language guaranteeing the right to expression and religious belief, including the right to convert. This topic is especially controversial this year, following calls by The Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights in Iran, Ahmed Shaheed, and the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief, Heiner Bielefeldt, to Iran to ensure the practice of freedom of religion. The Special Rapporteurs’ calls were made in response to imprisonments and death penalty sentences for charges of apostasy following cases of conversion.
There is also some concern that the recently-passed Human Rights Council (HRC) Resolution A/HRC/21L.2, "Promoting human rights and fundamental freedoms through a better understanding of traditional values of humankind: best practices,” might provide language and precedent for codifying intolerance and/or oppression.
Death Penalty
2012 has been unofficially dubbed Death Penalty Year, with the Secretary-General and Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) taking special interest in the issue. A number of delegations, as well, strongly support a death penalty moratorium.
Resolution on Extrajudicial Executions, and LGBT rights
Resolution A/RES/65/208 is the only instance in the United Nations system of language pertaining to sexual orientation, in Paragraph 6b. There is concern that this language will be removed, leaving the LGBT community with no explicit guarantees of rights. The resolution currently
“urges all states… to ensure the effective protection of the right to life of all persons under their jurisdiction, to investigate promptly and thoroughly all killings, including those targeted at specific groups of persons, such as racially motivated violence leading to the death of the victim, killings of persons belonging to national or ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities or because of their sexual orientation, killings of persons affected by terrorism or hostage-taking or living under foreign occupation, killings of refugees, internally displaced persons, migrants, street children or members of indigenous communities, killings of persons for reasons related to their activities as human rights defenders, lawyers, journalists or demonstrators, killings committed in the name of passion or in the name of honour, all killings committed for discriminatory reasons on any basis as well as all other cases where a person’s right to life has been violated.”
This list of people not to be targeted is long, yet non-exhaustive, leading some to suggest removal of the itemizing list, to be supplanted with a phrase such as “vulnerable populations.” While this phrase would theoretically encompass sexual orientation, the extraction of the single explicit protection for the gay, lesbian, and bi-sexual community is something to be avoided, according to many NGOs and delegations. There is also some support for the idea that the phrase “sexual orientation” should be elaborated to explicitly include reference to transgender people as well, and simultaneous worry that doing so would galvanize States with conservative gender policies to re-oppose the inclusion any sexual orientation language at all.
The provision on sexual orientation was added to the resolution originally in 1999, and was removed in 2010, following an initiative led by the Organization of the Islamic Conference and the United Nation’s African Regional Group, including Uganda, South Africa, and Rwanda. The provision was reinstated last year, following a United States-backed movement in conjunction with vociferous NGO lobbying.
Additional Resources for Treaty Bodies
The debate hinges on whether limited resources available for the Human Rights Treaty Body system ought be spent on reforming the system, or on supporting Treaties Bodies that request extra time and support in the performance of their mandates.
The Russian Federation has submitted a letter proposing amendments to the treaty body system, which purportedly are intended to increase efficiency and prevent the treaty body system from overreaching it’s technical mandates. Accession of so many states to the various human rights treaties has resulted in a backlog within the system that overwhelms the system’s capacity to consider issues in a timely fashion. However, there is concern that the proposals suggested by the Russian Federation would result in a curtailing of the system rather than its increased efficiency.
Programme 20 and Threats to the Independence of the OHCHR
This is a fairly complicated programme through which Cuba has previously (Programme 19) attempted to restrict the independence of the OHCHR. The programme runs parallel to the 67th session of the Third Committee, and many smaller delegations lack extra staff to send to the meetings. As such, moderate voices may be underrepresented, leaving the floor to delegations with more extreme positions, which may therefore receive little resistance.
The crux of the debate is which body—the HRC or the General Assembly—ought to have oversight of the OHCHR via approval of the Strategic Framework of human rights programming. As the Committee for Programme and Coordination (CPC) was considering Programme 19 in New York this June, Cuba raised the subject in the HRC in Geneva, claiming the OHCHR should report first to the HRC, and that the HRC should have particular power to approve the OHCHR budget. The HRC, during its 15th session, adopted a President’s Statement (PRST 15/2), which was “prepared in consultation with the High Commissioner.” While “reaffirming full support for the mandate of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,” the PRST 15/2
“1. Acknowledges the ongoing constructive dialogue between the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the Human Rights Council, and thanks the High Commissioner, in particular, for her letter dated 3 May 2010 addressed to the President of the Council, asking him to share the Secretary- General's proposed strategic framework for programme 19, Human rights, with the members of the Council and offering to compile and submit to the Committee for Programme and Coordination any comments they might have;
2. Invites the High Commissioner to present the Secretary-General's proposed strategic framework for programme 19, Human rights, to the Council prior to its submission to the Committee for Programme and Coordination, for the purpose of the High Commissioner to compile and submit the views of States and relevant stakeholders for transmission to the Committee for its consideration.”
The High Commissioner “steadfastly maintained that the statement … does not compromise her Office’s independence,” and that the President’s invitation is not legally binding. However, China and Cuba disagreed, which Cuba followed up by proposing a formal review procedure to the Strategic Framework in the HRC and inviting the General Assembly to consider the HRC the proper reviewing body.
If successful, all of this would seem to actually represent a somewhat ephemeral gain for the agenda of States that would see the OHCHR reigned in, since the composition of the HRC would ultimately determine the politics of OHCHR oversight, sometimes potentially bolstering OHCHR support. However, consistent independence of the OHCHR is nevertheless vital. Some delegations have said that, while they support OHCHR independence, the High Commissioner should be more balanced in her work, which some see as overly funded and staffed by Western States.
Country Specific Resolutions
Country specific resolutions are expected on the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Myanmar, and Iran, with language in the case of Myanmar being altered compared to previous years to reflect the country’s recent changes. A potential resolution on Syria is a key question, with the previous resolution having been presented as a “one-off” and the violence in the country having so severely escalated. Iran’s presidency of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) this year is a potential issue, though many delegations seem unconcerned with Iranian influence stemming from that capacity. Potentially, the 66th General Assembly sessions’s resolution on Syria may serve as a precedent for the NAM voting for country specific resolutions, which it has traditionally rejected.
