By Jakob Silas Lund, 19 January 2010

In the heated environment that accompanies Security Council reform debates, opinions and narrow national interests are oftentimes presented as altruistic aspirations or hard facts. As a result, it can be difficult to obtain unbiased information from diplomats about the “pros” and “cons” of various proposals that aren’t colored by national sentiment. Through extensive interviews with experts as well as current and former Ambassadors and diplomats who have been close to the reform process, this article outlines and analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of the components incorporated in the proposals currently on the table.

The Five Key Areas

In 2007, the President of the General Assembly (GA) Sheikha Al Khalifa introduced what she termed the “five key cluster areas”. These areas are: the size of an enlarged Security Council; the categories of membership; questions concerning regional representation; questions regarding extending the power of the veto to additional member states; and the working methods of the Security Council and its relationship with the General Assembly. All the proposals currently on the table build on the structure of these five areas. It soon becomes apparent that the five areas overlap to a great extent and the sharp division in which they are presented here—and by member states—is in many ways artificial. Nonetheless, viewing each of the areas separately provides us with a logical structure in which to focus on distinct aspects of each of the reform proposals.

Size of A Reformed Security Council

The No Expansion Option
Most proposals regarding the size of a reformed Council are within the “low-twenties” (20-23 members) to “mid-twenties” (23-26 members) ranges. The possibility of retaining the Council’s current size is not, to our knowledge, promoted by any member states. Since it would be a continuation of the status quo, the advantages and disadvantages of the no-expansion option becomes apparent as the pros and cons of each of the other options are reviewed. In brief, those who most strongly favor expanding the Council, cite a lack of democracy and geographic representation as the most pressing reasons for expansion, while those having reservations associated with expansion express concerns on its potential negative impact on the Council’s ability to carry outs its work efficiently as well as the difficulties member states are having in agreeing on the method or methods to be used to either select or elect additional members, decide on the category to put them in and the powers to include.

Allowing things to remain as they are, however, may be a much more realistic option than one might assume. One expert close to the process says that some of the G41 countries are genuinely nervous that the no-expansion option may actually be the more likely outcome of the continuously stalled negotiations. According to this expert, Germany and Japan are particularly wary of this possibility, whereas India perceives that its case for permanent membership on the Council is only growing stronger as its population and economy grows in both absolute numbers and relative to the rest of the world2. While no one openly favors not expanding the Council at all, it seems that some countries are actually quite satisfied with the current situation. Particularly for those who oppose expanding the Council by adding permanent members, no expansion may seem a better option than allowing a development they so strongly oppose. Furthermore, some individuals who have followed the progression of the reform debates for years believe that some of the P5 countries are more than happy to see reform moving at near-zero-velocity speed. They note that a P5 country’s distaste for reform may at times come in the guise of explicit support for one—and only one—of the potential candidates, say Germany or Japan. The country can then appear to be supporting reform while actually, knowingly blocking progress by insisting on its support for one specific country.

Low Twenties Option
One step up the numerical ladder we find “the low twenties option.” To retain flexibility, most member states talk of numbers in intervals rather than actual digits. The “low twenties” interval could include adding either five- to seven non-permanent members or a mixed number of permanent and non-permanent members, depending on whether an agreement is reached that is closer to the proposals put on the table by the G4 or the UFC. The reason most often given in favor of the low-twenties model is efficiency. Particularly the US has emphasized the need for keeping the Council small and efficient. In fact, it appears as if the US would not accept under any circumstance an expansion beyond the low twenties. Others argue that a modest expansion such as this would be insufficient in thoroughly reforming the Council and that it would merely constitute a minor adjustment to the existing flawed system. Africa’s oft-repeated demand for at least two permanent seats and two non-permanent seats, for example, would render it politically impossible to limit the total expansion to less than eight additional seats.

Mid-Twenties Option
“Mid twenties” includes a range of numbers that could cover most of the different proposals currently on the table. The G4, in their A/60/L46 proposal suggested that six permanent and four non-permanent members be added to the Council. They claim this would contribute to both the legitimacy and the efficiency of the Council. One insider opines that the issue of efficiency may just be an excuse for both those for and those against expanding the Council use to justify their positions. Those against adding permanent members contend that doing so would lessen the Council’s efficiency while those in favor say it would strengthen it; more on this below.

High Twenties Option
Few countries openly support the “high twenties” option. As reported in an earlier article by the Center Malta used the phrase “significant expansion” in a recent debate but apart from President Gadaffi’s suggestion during the opening debate of the 64th GA of creating a Council with 190 members, not much support has been garnered for the “high twenties” proposal. The most repeated concern about such an option is that efficiency would be sacrificed on the altar of increased geographic representation. Alternatively, there are those who contend that enhanced geographic representation, particularly of the regions that today feel underrepresented, namely Africa and Latin America, would add credibility and greater support for Council decisions. In the event that the “high twenties” model is agreed upon, groups such as the Central and Eastern European States and the Small Island Developing States may even be eyeing a chance for seats on the Council.

In an interview with the Center, one expert and former participant in the reform process compares the Council to national governmental cabinets, which rarely exceed 20 ministers. That is so for a reason, the expert says, arguing that a too large a Council would render it a different kind of body altogether undermining the executive powers it holds today. That is the very reason, in the opinion of this same expert, that some countries lobby for the high-twenties model: they resent the executive power of the Council and see a grossly expanded Council as the best way to curb this power. On the other hand, it can be argued that for the decisions of the Council to be efficacious, the major players on the world stage must be included in the decision-making process. Can a range of the world’s largest countries be expected to buy-in to and accept policy decisions affecting the whole world if their voices have not been heard in the process of forming these policies? How important is it to address such concerns?

It is difficult to assess the claims about efficiency. There is no lack of those who contend that the Council is not particularly efficient in its current state. But whether that is due to its size is a wholly different matter. Most analysts agree that political will—or lack thereof—is the main reason for any lack of efficiency and that numbers may not, per se, be an aid to or an obstacle to efficiency.

A final aspect to consider is that an increased number of members in the Council would most likely result in a changed proportion of permanent vis-à-vis non-permanent members. As the weight of permanent members would change relative to the non-permanent members, non-permanent ones could end up with either a larger majority or just the opposite: being in a minority in a Council with, say, six new permanent members. This, of course, will depend on the categories of new memberships. Furthermore, the implications of this potential shift would depend on several factors, such as whether a new group—for example the “P11”—would act in a unified manner. In addition, how many votes would be needed to reach a decision and how these would be apportioned among the different categories of Council members would also be a factor. For instance, when the Council was expanded to 15 seats in 1965, 9 votes, not 8, to include all of the P5, was set as the number of votes needed to pass a substantive measure.

Categories of Membership
The discussion of the different categories of membership is probably the most contentious one. To some extent it includes the issue of the veto, which is discussed in more depth further below.

Intermediate Model
While the Center in a recent article speculated that the intermediate model may be the one most likely to be accepted by two thirds of the GA Member States (128) required for passage, the most obvious shortcoming of this proposal is that there is very little agreement on what exactly the proposal entails. As one insider noted: for those who want an expansion in both categories of Council membership, the intermediate model is a way to get that, and for those who only want to add non-permanent seats to the Council, the model is a way to get that. This interpretive dichotomy based on the vagueness of the intermediate proposal, however, may provide the flexibility needed to allow a compromise to be reached. Evidence for this is provided by some recent conversations with the Center as well as statements made during reform debates. For instance, a G4 diplomat said that his country could possibly accept a review period that would not necessarily conclude with an automatic re-election of the “semi-permanent” members3. At the same time, some of the ardent opponents of the both-categories model may be willing to accept the possibility of immediate re-election of non-permanent members. In a recent exchange in the GA regarding reform of the Council, Indonesia said that although they favor expansion in principle in both categories, the intermediate approach appears to be the most constructive for the moment. Beyond its political feasibility, the intermediate proposal’s lack of definitiveness gives it an additional advantage: using its proposed review period, countries can postpone final decisions on the most contentious issues, leaving them for their successors to resolve.

One difficulty surrounding the intermediate model, however, is getting agreement on which countries should be included in the group of member states that will get the proposed long-term seats with the possibility of re-election. Aside from groups formed primarily to reflect economic might, such as the G20, other political considerations also have to be taken into account when electing members for the Council. An expert familiar with the debate believes it may be impossible to leave out an Arab voice or to overlook regional disputes, which may make if difficult if not impossible to include one regional power while leaving out another. The guidelines from the UN Charter are sparse. Article 23 (1) just states that due regard must be paid to the contribution of potential non-permanent members to the “maintenance of international peace and security and to the other purposes of the Organization” as well as to “geographical distribution.” This definition is broad enough that Japan can argue that its monetary contribution falls within the category, while some Troop Contributing Countries can maintain that they represent the clearest example of contributing international peace and security. It should be noted that the Charter names the 5 states that are to have permanent seats and does not provide any provisions for adding additional permanent seats or standards that should be used for such a purpose. Should provisions be made for adding additional permanent or semi permanent seats, however, it would make common sense to apply the same criteria for selecting permanent or semi-permanent members that Article 23 (1) sets for selecting non-permanent members. The process to be used in making the selections of such members, however, may have to be different in consideration of the permanency or the potential for permanency of the appointment. The possible methods to be used in making the actual appointments and the differences on the views of member states on this question are taken up below.

Both Categories
Expansion in the permanent category is strongly promoted or strongly opposed for exactly the same reason that can be summarized in one word: permanency. For some, it would provide for a more just representation of the world (see discussion on geographical representation below), in which all parts of the globe would be included in the decision-making process of the body responsible for ensuring international peace and security. As one proponent, Brazil, recently argued expansion in the permanent category would lead to: “greater legitimacy and effectiveness of the Council’s work.” But for others, it would mean increased injustice, enabling more countries to wield the veto power and stay on the Council for all eternity without any restrictive measures of accountability. In this regard, one observer commented that rather than increasing democratic representation, granting permanent seats in the Council to the current frontrunners—all of whom highlight their economic weight as reasons for their candidacy—would amount to rewarding economic might with political power.

Beyond the perceived justice or injustice that permanent membership on the Council represents, some see expansion in the permanent category as a threat to regional dynamics. In the EU, granting Germany a permanent seat would skew the power balance and arguably render Italy, Spain and other “medium powers” weakened relative to France, the UK and Germany. Some have suggested merging the EU’s permanent membership aspirations into either one or two seats that would rotate between member states. This would, of course, not only change the power relationships within the Union but also require France and the UK to agree to the loss of their current special status. In Latin America, the threat perceived by some countries to the power balance becomes evident when looking at the group of countries opposed to adding permanent seats to the Council, the UFC, which includes Argentina, Colombia, Mexico, Costa Rica and other Latin American countries.

Non-Permanent Only
In the last debate on Security Council reform of the 63rd session of the GA, Germany, with a melodic metaphor, said that expanding the Council with only non-permanent members would merely add more voices to the “choir” rather than change the “song” of the Council. It is argued that by adding only non-permanent members, the basic power structure will prevail and no substantial change will have been obtained.

But those who oppose expansion in the permanent category argue that only increased non-permanent membership will lead to more efficiency in the Council. One of the things the Council has traditionally been criticized for is its stalling tactics and failure to provide timely action when needed. Critics ask why the Council didn’t take action in Rwanda in 1994 and why more wasn’t done to stop the appalling situation in Darfur, and those who favor expansion in the non-permanent category ask rhetorically how endowing more member states with the right to veto would help address the lack of meaningful action in the face of atrocities and other urgent crises.

As pointed out by an expert and former participant in the reform process interviewed by the Center, the discussion about categories of membership really revolves around the veto more than anything else. The bigger point, in this expert’s opinion, is that there are some countries, which it would be too costly to coerce into complying with the voice of the majority. He bases his analysis on a cost-benefit basis: what would be gained or lost from granting country X a permanent seat? If, for example, the GA magically succeeded in abolishing the veto altogether it is likely that the P5 would take their business elsewhere. The UN would then, in this expert’s opinion, end up with a net loss. He lists the possession of nuclear weapons as another factor that should be taken into account when doing the cost-benefit analysis, adding that the moral principles one would like to apply when discussing reform may at times clash with what is most realistic and effective.

An additional question one may want to ask regarding the composition and structure of a reformed Council is to what extent the agreed-upon solution will be flexible and capable of adapting to future geo-political changes. Could it be imagined, for example, that it might be desirable to remove countries from the Council rather than adding more? The intermediate model envisions a review period that could result in not granting re-election to some candidates, which some see as a much-needed option but no one has proposed the idea that all permanent members should also be subject to review or a change in their status based on specific criteria. This, of course, would go against the very notion of permanency and would most likely be entirely unfeasible from a political perspective in view of the Charter amendment that would need to be ratified to accomplish it, but these ideas might nonetheless be worth contemplating for the sake of exploring future scenarios.

Working methods and relationship with GA

Extending the Veto to New, Semi-permanent Members
The discussion about whether to extend the right of the veto to new members is in many ways parallel to the discussion about the categories of membership. And the arguments for and against are also quite similar. There is an additional twist to this issue, however: many of the countries or blocs that are vying for seats in an enlarged Council, particularly the African countries, say that they are in principle against the veto but that for the sake of democracy and equality it is paramount that new members have the same rights and privileges as the P5 currently holds. The issues of democracy and equality are common themes held by both those who wish to grant the veto to new potential members and those who do not.

Those opposing expansion of the veto say it will hamper the ability of the Council to address crisis situations in a timely fashion, or in some situations, at all. Added to that is possibly a certain level of wariness on the part of many Western countries with a taste for such concepts as the responsibility to protect, concepts which have received harsh criticism from many African countries. Some speculate that granting two African countries the veto may be a serious blow to implementing the doctrine of the responsibility to protect as well as weakening the International Criminal Court, which is in some circumstances depend on action by the Council, as provided by Article 13 of the Rome Statute.

Some speculate that a few of the most arduous proponents of expanding the veto are, in fact, trying to halt progress on reforms that they do not really support. The complex explanation for this is that an African country with no chance of winning either of the two permanent seats being requested for Africa, may see insisting on including the veto power as the best way to maintain a pan-African ethos of solidarity while simultaneously ensuring that none of the current front-runners will actually succeed in gaining permanency on the Council. This is the reason why some view the African group as being the most difficult stumbling block for the G4 in their quest to include additional permanent seats in any Council expansion.

Abolishing the Veto for Genocide and Other Crimes Against Humanity
The S54 has urged the P5 to agree to refrain from using the veto in cases of genocide, crimes against humanity, and serious violations of international humanitarian law. The benefits of such a limitation is fairly obvious. The downsides are less clear. The P5 countries point out that the rules of procedure of the Council are to be decided on by the Council as provided by and in accordance with Article 30 of the Charter. They argue that compromising on that principle could lead to a corrosion of the relationship between the GA and the Council. On a broader scale, there is a fear that allowing anyone to limit the privileges of the P5 could undermine the whole functioning of the Council. For those who want to see the veto modified or eliminated altogether, none of these concerns are sufficient to justify not limiting the veto, which in too many instances, they believe, has blocked the ability of the Council to take effective, timely action to safeguard peace and prevent the massive loss of life.

An additional complication, which arises when considering abolishing the veto under the aforementioned circumstances, is the issue of whether to include designating a crisis ”genocide,” “crime against humanity,” or a ”serious violation of international humanitarian law.” This was made abundantly clear in the Council debate surrounding whether or not the atrocities carried out in Darfur in the last decade fell within the legal definition of genocide included in the Genocide Convention. Some speculated that the recently published Goldstone report further strengthened US opposition to giving up the right to use the veto in cases of certain specified crimes, given the disagreement about whether Israel’s conduct in Gaza constituted war crimes or not5. Both Russia and China have their own internal conflicts to deal with and have little appetite for discussing whether actions they have taken in dealing with these could be designated a crime for which the use of the power of the veto could no longer be invoked if the proposed reform were to be adopted.

Extending the Veto to Semi-Permanent Members Conditionally
It has been proposed to formally extend the veto to new, semi-permanent members, but requiring them to promise not to use it for the extension of the review period. This would, in principle, present the same opportunities and problems as discussed above, but add a new twist: how can it be implemented and administered legally? Would the Charter be extended before the review period to provide for the new, semi-permanent category of membership? Would the promise not to use the veto be inscribed into the Charter? Would everything be postponed until after the review process, alternatively would changes to the Charter be carved up in a legal step-by-step process? These questions may seem mundane but could prove very difficult to solve in real life and without a clear answer the model could be rendered useless.

Completely Abolishing the Veto
A former Pakistani Ambassador to the UN, Ahmad Kamal, states that in a democracy no one can be more equal than others and he terms the veto anachronistic and undemocratic, a sentiment echoed by many African countries. Abolishing the veto altogether seems to appeal to quite a few member states, but many of these same states also maintain that if they themselves end up on the Council it would only be fair that they be endowed with the right of veto.

Among those who oppose abolishing the veto—and the P5 are the most prominent in that group—references are made to the League of Nations, which many believe ended up in demise because major powers such as the US refused to join. This, they argue, is exactly what would happen if the veto was abolished: the major powers of the world would either leave the UN or disregard or refuse to pay for UN actions they oppose. Whether the major powers would actually risk losing the legitimacy provided by the Charter is an open question, but the scenario presents the flip side of the cost-benefit analysis discussed above in the section on categories of membership. In reality the debate would seem to be moot as long as any P5 member refuses to agree to abolish or modify the veto: Article 108 of the Charter provides that two-thirds of the membership of the UN including all of the permanent members must ratify amendments to the Charter. Only then does the amendment come into force for all UN members.

While the veto could appear to be one of those irreconcilable issues that divide people as abortion, health care and tax questions do in local American politics, some diplomats close to the process say that it will not be a major determining factor when push comes to shove. As discussed recently by the Center, there are rumors that the African group may be willing to soften their insistence on the Ezulwini consensus, which includes a demand for at least two permanent and two non-permanent seats in the Council for Africa, and supposedly this would include their stance regarding the veto.

As described in a recent article by the Center, there is, at least theoretically, a large majority of member states in favor of revamping the working methods of the Council as well as its relationship with the GA. Two issues, however, seem to inhibit progress: those who can directly decide on the matters, the P5, are not eager to change things, and those who could put pressure on the P5, the remaining 187 member states, cannot thus far agree on whether and how to do so.

To date, the Center has found unanimous agreement among non-P5 member states that the Council should hold more open meetings. Even P5 representatives to whom the Center has spoken agree that more open meetings could increase transparency at the UN as a whole. And indeed, the number of open meetings has gone up over the last several years. There have reportedly also been more meetings between the President of the GA and the Council in recent years. Nonetheless, many also note that there is a limit to the number of open meetings the Council can have. Representatives from these countries maintain that certain discussions need to stay within the exclusive forum of the Council for it to maintain its efficacy.

Furthermore, as recently reported by the Center, some believe the increased number of open meetings has resulted in more decisions being reached outside the formal forum of the Council’s chamber before they are brought to the full Council for a vote. Among other things, the informal meetings, oftentimes held by the P5—at times even by a smaller segment of the permanent members—are reportedly used to negotiate ways around usage of the veto. By settling contentious issues in an informal environment, the veto-wielding powers avoid having a veto cast when they vote on the action to be taken in the chamber. This process is seen by some as a positive way of reaching compromises and thus avoiding vetoes being cast, while others see it as an undemocratic rigging process that may block effective Council action while protecting the reputation of the veto threatening power or powers, but harming the image of the Council itself for its inability to contain a crisis situation. It is easy to imagine that extension of the veto to a handful of additional member states would make agreement in some crisis situations harder to reach, while at the same time lending greater weight to and support for those agreements that are reached. These contending views serve to underline the power associated with wielding the veto and why some member states believe that to achieve equitable representation the veto needs to be extended to more countries or eliminated altogether.

Asked about the advantages and disadvantages of reforming the working methods of the Council, experts were hard pressed to list aspects that would be disadvantageous to the world as a whole rather than merely to the P5. It is clear that the P5 is very concerned with any non–Council member trying to meddle with the procedures of the Council. The P5 has continuously made it clear, as did a P5 diplomat in an interview for this article, that the Council and the GA are two equal and independent bodies and must behave as such.

Geographical Representation
As described above, Article 23 of the Charter states that when choosing non-permanent members to sit on the Security Council “due regard” must be paid to the contribution of UN members to the maintenance of international peace and security, and also to equitable geographical distribution. Particularly the latter requirement is given as the main reason expansion is urgently needed now. Most member states agree that the current distribution of permanent seats in the Council severely under-represents some parts of the world, particularly Africa and Latin America, but also smaller states such as the Caribbean nations, and East European countries, which feel left out.

As expanded geographical representation would necessarily include numerical expansion, the advantages and disadvantages associated with broadening the geographical representation are the same as discussed above regarding a general expansion of the Council. Additionally, there is the question of whether a country can represent anyone other than itself that arises when considering whether to add regional or more individual seats.

Regional Seats
When discussing Security Council reform, Africa speaks with one united voice, demanding two permanent seats for its continent; others are unsatisfied with the lack of permanent Latin American membership; and Central and Eastern European countries, as noted earlier, want a seat for their group. It is thus clear that there is some sense of unity within geographical groups representing more than just one country. A 2007 letter from the appointed facilitators of Security Council reform, spelled out why some countries could be assumed to “represent, through internal arrangements, the views of the groups to which they belong.” This, however, is a questionable assumption in many, if not all, cases. For example, can Brazil, the only non-Spanish speaking country on the Latin American continent, be said to represent Latin America, as one diplomat close to the process asks. Taking into account the fierce disagreement among African countries concerning which two countries should represent them on the Council, how could the two countries chosen be considered to be representative? The stern resistance from countries neighboring the powers that are vying to become permanent members of the Council, such as Pakistan, Korea, Italy, and Argentina, is a sign that neither the G4 nor any other member state can represent anyone aside from itself on the Council according to one expert who spoke to the Center. This expert added that regional representation only makes sense when countries in a region have agreed in advance to pool their sovereignty and share seats or make some similar arrangements, which will ensure that regional representatives will in fact represent a whole region and not just their own countries.

If this type of agreement could be reached in Africa, Latin America and Europe, however, expansion would suddenly be seen in a different light. One of the main obstacles Africa faces in its quest to obtain two regional seats—aside from its insistence on including the veto power—is its insistence that the two countries to be offered permanent membership must be elected by the African Union. The US, for one, has stated that this is unacceptable and has underlined that the two countries must be named before they will even negotiate the question of giving them permanent seats. This observation could undermine the idea of providing for rotating seats. While the US might be willing to accept seats for Latin-America rotating between, say, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico or for Europe between, say, Germany, UK, France, Spain and Italy, it would be politically difficult for them to argue in favor of rotating seats if the countries to rotate were to be elected by the Organization of American States or the European Union, respectively, rather than being restricted to a rotation amongst specifically pre-named member states in advance.

Conclusion
As we have seen, virtually every aspect of Security Council reform can be and has been argued in at least two ways: one that purports to show why it is an indispensable part of a just solution, and the other that claims it would only weaken the ability of the Security Council to carry out its duties without solving the problems of equitable representation. This article was written to shed some light on the different aspects involved in the ongoing debates that are taking place on Security Council Reform issues at the UN. It highlights and explains the areas of contention that member states have encountered to date that have stymied progress on implementing reforms that were agreed to in principle, but not fleshed out in detail, by the world’s leaders and the General Assembly during the 2005 World Summit. Which proposals, if any, will be included as part of a final agreement—or even whether there will be sufficient compromise on the part of some key countries or groups to allow any agreement to be reached on Security Council reform—is impossible to predict at this point. As noted earlier, this may be the outcome that some powerful countries actually prefer. But whether such an outcome can fulfill the long-term interests of the world, or even of the UN itself, is a question that NGOs and diplomats alike might well ask themselves considering the need for change that the world’s leaders identified in 2005.

• 1. Brazil, Germany, India, Japan
• 2. The G4, along with South Africa, recently initiated a letter with the signatures of 138 member states, sent to Ambassador Tanin on December 23rd. The letter urges him to propose a composite paper that could serve as a basis for further negotiations. See our recent article on this issue
• 3. The semi-permanent membership is a name used for members that would be elected for a period of 5-15 (the exact numbers continue to be a source of further disagreement) years with possibility for re-election
• 4. Costa Rica, Jordan, Liechtenstein, Switzerland, Singapore
• 5. Whether or not the veto could be employed in a case of possible genocide would depend on whether a specific issue arising would be considered a procedural or ‘substantive’ matter, as defined by article 27 of the Charter