Should there be a Review of the Fifth Committee's Working Methods?

by Lydia Swart and Irene Martinetti
25 April 2007

Apart from important decisions on budgets and assessments, the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly also deliberates on key proposals in regard to management reform. Progress on some of these reform proposals has been slow and this analysis explores whether the working methods of the Fifth Committee may be as much to blame as the much lamented North-South divide. This analysis draws on the perspectives from current and past Fifth Committee delegates we interviewed, from both the North and the South.

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“I’d rather be Christmas shopping,” Ambassador Dumisani Kumalo from South Africa, then Chair of the Group of 77, reportedly quipped during one of the Fifth Committee’s informal meetings on Member States’ dues in the second half of December 2006. The negotiations needed to be concluded in a matter of days as a draft resolution had to be ready for adoption in the plenary on the 22nd of December. A major disagreement on the method for assessing Member States’ dues between the European Union – which saw an increase in its share of UN dues from 37% to almost 40% – and the Group of 77 was more than evident. Calculating dues based on a State’s gross national income over a longer period was more advantageous to the EU, but disadvantageous for most developing countries. The delegation from Finland, holding the EU Presidency, came with well-prepared arguments, reminding Ambassador Kumalo, for instance, that when chairing the Non-Aligned Movement before, he had favored a longer base period for assessing dues. According to one delegate, Ambassador Kumalo caused uproarious laughter when he remarked: “That’s why they kicked me out!” In the end, there was not enough time for a more substantial and interactive debate or for extensive lobbying in the corridors, and the EU relented. Too many other key issues were facing the same deadline in the Fifth Committee.

The Fifth Committee of the General Assembly is widely recognized as the only organ that functions as a counterweight to the Security Council based on its power over budget priorities and dues assessments. One delegate went so far as to suggest that a number of Ambassadors find the Fifth Committee to be “the second most important body in the UN after the Security Council.” Furthermore, decisions on resources and management reforms taken at the Fifth Committee not only have an impact on the ground but reverberate throughout the entire UN system.

Documentation and Scheduling Issues
To perform its functions, the Fifth Committee meets more frequently than any of the other committees of the General Assembly. It is well-known that Fifth Committee delegates regularly meet until late in the evening and at times even through the night. Weekend meetings are not unusual either, especially towards the end of its sessions. The longest Fifth Committee meeting on record lasted for 26 hours, starting on a Saturday at 10 o’clock in the morning, continuing through the night, and finally finishing at noon on Sunday.1 This year, its first session was scheduled to take place from 25 September through 8 December 2006, but the Fifth Committee did not finish meeting until 21 December, with many issues postponed to the first and second resumed sessions in 2007.

The large number of issues to be dealt with, as well as the huge amount of documentation produced for each session, is staggering. It includes audited financial statements, programme budgets, reports from the Secretariat in response to resolutions, reports from advisory, oversight and inspection bodies and units, among many others. A large number of the documents from the Secretariat pertaining to the discussions are often issued only shortly before, or shortly after, the beginning of the meetings,2 making it even more difficult for delegates to stay on top of the issues.

The late issuance of documentation also affects the work of the Advisory Committee on Budget and Administrative Questions (ACABQ) which provides recommendations to Member States. For example, the former Secretary General submitted his report on human resources management ( Investing in People) on 9 August 2006. However, as the report had to be translated into the six official languages, its actual issuance date was 27 September 2006, two days after the session started. As a consequence, the ACABQ’s report on the SG report did not come out until 26 October 2006.

Too often, such late receipt of documentation results in deferring issues to the resumed sessions, as was the case in regards to the consultations on a draft resolution on the reform of the governance and oversight system of the UN. The document, A/60/883/Add.1 & 2 , was officially issued on 28 August 2006 and the ACABQ’s response to this report was not available until 1 December 2006.

The overwhelming amount of documentation that the Fifth Committee requires is one of the main impediments to a leaner working process. One delegate discussing the Fifth Committee working methods admitted that the Committee requests so many documents that it is “frankly impossible” for the Secretariat to issue all of them on time.

The heavy meeting schedule and the daunting amount of highly technical and detailed documentation tends to hinder the capability of UN missions with a small staff to make an effective contribution to the work of the Committee. This causes many of these missions to rely heavily on the various groupings, such as the G77 and the EU.

The fact that the other GA Committees often seek the approval of the Fifth Committee on the financial implications of their own draft resolutions produced in the same time period is an additional factor contributing to its overburdened meeting schedule.

The negotiating process
In the eighties, Member States agreed to a resolution (A/41/213) stipulating that when approving budgetary items and resolutions, the “broadest possible agreement’ should be reached. This necessity to reach consensus has developed into quite an elaborate negotiating process towards the end of the session at which time delegates start frantically “exchanging brackets.” This entails negotiating their positions and ‘trading’ contentious or unresolved points from one resolution to the other, until the very last moment when draft resolutions have to be presented to the plenary of the General Assembly.

Having a deadline - the date when the GA needs to approve the draft resolutions coming out of the Fifth Committee - is in itself conducive to reach agreement as it forces Member States to find a compromise on their positions and reach agreement. Nevertheless, too many agenda items are postponed in practice.

Due to its peculiar negotiating process - and unlike the other Committees, which have specific time slots for consultations on each agenda item, clearing item by item on their agenda – the majority of the agenda items in the Fifth Committee are discussed simultaneously rather than consecutively, with most of them being concluded towards the end of the session. Member States initiate discussions on an agenda item at the beginning of a session, but because of the multitude of other agenda items; the late issuance of documentation; as well as delays that appear to be politically motivated, consultations drag on for months.

It has been suggested that the Fifth Committee allot different time slots and deadlines to each agenda item. However, reluctance of some Member States to change the procedures and stagger issues in the Fifth Committee appears to originate from the fact that it would hamper the final ‘bracket trading.’

One delegate expressed concern that the Fifth Committee often quickly approves extremely large budgets, especially in regard to peacekeeping, while small line items in the Secretariat’s budget, more politicized, are discussed at length. Another interviewee indicated that as the Security Council approves the peacekeeping budgets, following standard procedures, the Fifth Committee has as a result less influence on these.

Q&A Sessions
The Question and Answer (Q&A) sessions allow Member States to seek clarifications from the Secretariat. Some delegates think that Q&A sessions take too much time and are too repetitive. They suggest that some of these could be done in writing instead. But other delegates believe that the repetitiveness primarily occurs because Member States feel they are not getting the answers they want from the Secretariat. One interviewee thought that doing Q&A mostly in writing would likely only produce additional documentation and cause further delays.

One wonders whether scheduling Q&A sessions before the ACABQ recommendations on the issue have been received just wastes precious time. In fact, when human resources management reform was discussed at the first session in 2006, Q&A sessions were repetitive and unproductive before the issuance of the ACABQ report. Once distributed, it seemed to quickly determine which issues could be agreed upon during the session and which issues had to be postponed because they required further clarification. On the other hand, some delegates find that Q&A sessions help them become acquainted with the topics to be decided even if not all of the documents have been released.

Interaction between the Fifth Committee and the Secretariat
Several delegates indicated that the Secretariat and Member States seem to have “a bit of a rocky relationship.” Sometimes, delegates can be very harsh with staff from the Secretariat, while at other times it seems to be smooth sailing. Many delegates from the South feel that the Secretariat is too focused on Northern priorities, especially those of the Member States who pay higher dues. Southern delegates have further expressed their impression that the Secretariat is not only neglecting the concerns of most other Member States, but is also at times disrespectful. As a result, these delegates tend to distrust the answers given by the Secretariat and feel there is an overall lack of transparency. As a consequence, efforts from the South to stall some of the issues appear to be strategic, an attempt to force the attention they feel they deserve, but are not currently receiving, from the Secretariat.

Fifth Committee Delegates
The manner in which Member States engage in the Fifth Committee probably weighs on its decision-making process even more than its working methods, suggested a former Fifth Committee Chair. Ambassadors are often too busy to follow the intricacies of the work of the Fifth Committee and tend to neglect it, unless it concerns issues such as the scale of assessment or the deletion of budgetary items. Some of the interviewees feel that there is considerable apathy among the higher-level diplomats towards the Fifth Committee which has created a situation in which the decisions taken in this committee are often left to junior level delegates.

One interviewee confided that he had the impression that too many delegates do not thoroughly understand the issues that are being discussed. This may be due to the fact that every year, because of the staff rotations that are typical for most foreign ministries, a large number of delegates attend the meetings for the first time, struggling to quickly and fully comprehend the issues and to find out what transpired in previous years and why. He added that, on the other hand, some of the expert delegates intentionally keep their Ambassadors only vaguely informed by using jargon and convoluted information. Those Ambassadors, who may not wish to seem uninformed, do not sufficiently challenge their delegates’ positions.

Ambassadors and higher-level diplomats’ engagement in the working of the Fifth Committee would provide some weight to the Committee’s deliberations, as would an increased presence of more Under Secretary-Generals during Q&A sessions.3 One interviewee explained that Ambassadors would bring a much broader vision to the negotiations.

Lack of Transparency and Influence Peddling
One of the distinctive characteristics of the Fifth Committee’s negotiating process is the amount of haggling and horse-trading done behind the scene, that contribute to lack of transparency. It does not always seem clear that decisions are taken on merit. One gets the impression that delegates from many Member States use the budget process to pursue national or even personal interests.4 Some delegates have specific pet issues they feel passionate about and they appear to lose sight of the bigger picture. And especially the domination of just a handful of the more expert or vocal delegates in the Fifth Committee has at times seriously and negatively impacted the work of the Fifth Committee. These ‘spoilers’ – using the consensus building process to their advantage – can often by themselves determine the outcome of negotiations. One interviewee felt, however, that the so-called spoilers are often rightfully challenging some of the prevailing trends and positions.

Is the size of the Fifth Committee a problem?
In September 2006, a report of an independent Steering Committee, entrusted by the Secretary General with providing recommendations on how to strengthen the oversight and governance mechanisms of the UN, stirred up strong feelings5 by mentioning the universal membership of the Fifth Committee as a substantial obstacle to the swift reaching of agreement on budgetary matters. The report suggested that the Fifth Committee should become a budget committee with a smaller, more manageable size.

However, too many Member States see the Fifth Committee as a unique organ that cannot be equated to the financial board of a corporation or smaller agency, and the recommendation was simply disregarded. Moreover, the size of the Fifth Committee in itself may not make it less effective. As one delegate explained: “…within the modus operandi of the Fifth Committee there is a natural selection process. A de facto downsizing of the Committee occurs when Member States are negotiating a resolution at midnight on 22 December. Then you will only see States which have a real interest in the outcomes of the resolution being discussed, certainly not all of them. Also, the fact that a considerable number of Member States work in groups, such as the EU and the G77, already functions as a rationalizing factor.” In fact, although all 192 Member States are represented in the Fifth Committee, one rarely sees more than 50 delegates at the informal meetings where most of the work takes place. Of the roughly 50 delegates present at the informal meetings, less than half pose questions or provide comments, and many of these are made on behalf of a large grouping.

Resolutions
The Fifth Committee is one of the most prolific among the GA committees. During the past session, it produced 52 resolutions (with its 68 resolutions, only the Third Committee produced more). However, with the exception of the resolutions on the scale of assessment, which are monitored carefully as they affect the functioning of the UN and the interests of each Member State, the implementation of most resolutions is not scrutinized properly. In particular, the resolutions addressing reform issues would benefit from an agreement between the Member States and the Secretariat on specific timeframes and on ways to monitor the implementation of the resolutions. All resolutions taken by the Fifth Committee can be found on the UN’s website, but there currently is no tool, such as a database, that organizes the various resolutions by subject which would help to identify possible overlap – or even contradictions - between resolutions and monitor the progress on their implementation. Such a tool could potentially prevent the repetitiveness of many of the resolutions.6

A Role for Civil Society
Because the Fifth Committee deals with very technical issues, NGOs have tended not to pay much attention to its work and resolutions. Yet, the budget and reform decisions made at the Fifth Committee will often impact the issues they do focus on. NGOs working on human rights should realize that funding decisions will determine whether the ad hoc tribunals on the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, for example, will be sufficiently funded to effectively do their work. Environmental organizations should take an interest in UNEP’s budget which has become too dependent on voluntary – and typically earmarked - contributions. NGOs that work to make the UN more effective need to take an interest in the reform proposals being discussed at the Fifth Committee. Though the UN’s Department of Public Information produces excellent accounts of plenary sessions, it does not cover the bulk of the work of the Fifth Committee that takes place in informal sessions. For a handful of NGOs to be able to report on these informal sessions would much improve the transparency of the Committee’s work and decision-making processes. In addition, according to a former Fifth delegate, having NGOs with relevant expertise provide input on the draft budget would potentially benefit the process. Posting draft and approved budgets as well as audits on the UN’s website could enhance transparency and invite expert input as well.

Conclusion
Regretfully, the Fifth Committee is not the efficient and effective budget and oversight body one would hope for. It often works under less than ideal circumstances for good decision making. Some of its delegates lack capacity or expertise to do their jobs properly and Fifth Committee dynamics mean that the agenda is often hijacked by a few delegates, most times to the detriment of the majority. The Fifth Committee has become the committee in the GA where the fault lines in the UN membership are most visible: the power of the purse (rich, dominant members) versus the power of the majority, compounded by a difference in priorities: security issues are high on the agenda of the North, while development is the key issue for the South.

Though politics to a large extent underlies the ineffectiveness of the Fifth Committee, an exploration of the Fifth Committee’s working methods seems warranted. Possible improvements could include:

• Allocate specific time slots with clear deadlines for specific issues, depending on all relevant documentation being received.
• Make the Q&A sessions more effective, avoiding repetitiveness, by pooling questions received in writing. Then give the Secretariat sufficient time to provide comprehensive answers, after which one interactive and concluding debate on all the issues raised could take place.7
• Ensure more engagement from Ambassadors which could bring a broader vision to the negotiations.
• Ensure more engagement from Under-Secretary-Generals (or the Heads of offices when there is no USG) from the Secretariat during the Q&A session to ensure that Member States’ concerns are fully understood at the highest levels.
• Allow limited and appropriate engagement from relevant representative experts from Civil Society which would contribute to making the Fifth Committee negotiating process more transparent.
• Review the process of nominating, appointing, and remunerating members to advisory bodies with the view to ensure the independence of these members
• Create a database that would monitor the implementation of resolutions from the Fifth Committee and also help identify duplications or contradictions in draft resolutions.
• Post budgets and audits on the UN’s website to allow for expert input and increased transparency.

Proposals to review the Working Methods of the Fifth Committee have been around for a long time. In the past, the consensus process allowed such proposals to be shot down by just a few Member States. Nevertheless, increased transparency and a rationalization of the work in the Fifth Committee fits well in the overall reform efforts currently taking place at the United Nations. It is time for Member States to take a genuine look at a process that has too often been dismissed as rather bizarre and unproductive.

• 1. This meeting took place in December 1997 and dealt, among other issues, with Kofi Annan’s first UN reform proposals.
• 2. See Status of preparedness of documentation for the Fifth Committee during the main part of the sixty-first session of the General Assembly (A/C.5/61/L.1).
• 3. According to one interviewee, USGs should not travel from mid-October through mid-December so they can participate in Q&As.
• 4. When delegates that participate in negotiations are subsequently hired by the Secretariat or appointed to positions on the ACABQ by Member States, this raises obvious concerns about conflict of interest.
• 5. The delegate from South Africa, on behalf of the G77, referred to this reduction in size as the ‘elephant in the room.’
• 6. Such a database would be even more useful if it also provided summaries of Q&As from previous sessions.
• 7. One interviewee felt that as the Secretariat will not necessarily answer the questions fully and satisfactory, one concluding debate is unlikely to suffice.