



PERMANENT MISSION OF THE PRINCIPALITY OF LIECHTENSTEIN
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

OPEN-ENDED WORKING GROUP ON THE QUESTION OF
EQUITABLE REPRESENTATION ON AND INCREASE IN THE MEMBERSHIP
OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL
AND OTHER MATTERS RELATED TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL

STATEMENT

BY

H.E. AMBASSADOR CHRISTIAN WENAWESER,
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE PRINCIPALITY OF LIECHTENSTEIN
TO THE UNITED NATIONS

NEW YORK, 10 APRIL 2008

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Mr. President,

We commend the authors and in particular the main author, our colleague from Cyprus, for the hard work put into this effort and for a very respectable product. We were skeptical of the prospects of the overarching process in the beginning and are glad that we have been proven wrong. While we have some critical comments to offer, we are aware that the imperative of feasibility was certainly an overriding consideration in this exercise.

We would have preferred to consider a paper that is limited to the different options *within* the **intermediary approach**. An approach that constitutes a bridge not just in time, but much rather in substance, a middle ground between the positions that are well-known since 2005. The authors of the paper, we assume, might well have had the same preference, but yielded to the political realities. We are of the view that the proposals submitted in the past have not shown the way to a solution and that they will not do so in the future. Therefore, considering a paper which reflects *all* options that have previously been on the table does not necessarily constitute progress.

We think that one important element is missing – an element closely tied to the idea of **long-term renewable seats** in an intermediary approach. It would be necessary, under this scenario, to prevent States running for seats in this new, third category, to also run, at or around the same time, for a two year non-renewable seat. This is a very practical and effective measure to increase, at least to some extent, the chances of States to serve on the Council. Small States make up more than half of the membership, so they certainly are one of the most important constituencies on SC enlargement.

We appreciate the inclusion of some provisions on **working methods** in the paper. We appreciate just as much the understanding expressed by the authors that the issue of working methods can also be addressed separately. We continue to believe: first, that working methods are at least as important as enlargement, and second, that working methods will always be neglected when lumped together with enlargement. Policy statements of a general nature such as those contained in the draft are fine and a good basis to build on, but the experience acquired over the past few years, in particular our experience as a member of the S-5, makes it clear that they do not really address the problem, let alone solve it. The Security Council decided, in July 2006 and largely in response to the draft resolution of the S-5, on a set of specific measures on working methods, but has refrained from consistent application and implementation ever since.

We have more comments to offer, of course, but this is not the place or time for doing that. In spite of our desire to have a text for negotiation that is a better reflection of the state of affairs today, we also realize that this paper is, at this stage, probably "as good as is gets". We are therefore willing and happy to start working on its basis and to do so very soon. Naturally, there is a strong wish in the membership to get some clarity on the process we embark on. We are of the view that a **negotiating process** must now take place under your leadership. This of course enables you to choose a person or persons who conduct the negotiations on your behalf. But it is essential that the ultimate authority and responsibility rests with your office.

Also, the process has to be **transparent and inclusive**. Security Council reform is of the highest relevance to the membership as a whole and goes to the very core of this organization. Any formula for enlargement can only be successful if it truly reflects the collective political will of the membership and thus meets with the strongest possible political support. The negotiating process should be conducted with the understanding that we all advance our criticism, make contributions, amendments, additions to the negotiating text and that no outside or parallel tracks are pursued. We must of course be prepared for this to be an extremely difficult endeavor. We might well see a first phase of negotiations where more options are added on to the text and gaps are widened instead of narrowed. We must therefore also provide for a mechanism that reviews the negotiating process as such. An evaluation or assessment of this kind should use progress made and the promise of further progress as the main yardstick. Here again, we would be happy to rely on your leadership, Mr. President, as well as the leadership of the person or persons you designate to work on your behalf.

We realize of course that there is no common understanding, at this time, on how to proceed. We hope that the Task Force established by you, Mr. President, will use the coming days for extensive consultations with a view to creating such a common understanding of a negotiating process. This is not an easy undertaking, but it should be carried out with some clear parameters that should include a timeline for reporting back to the membership as a whole. One obvious lesson learned during the time elapsed since the World Summit is certainly that the issue of SC reform does not just go away, as much as some of us might wish that. Let us not forget that there was a strong call for the beginning of negotiations from all stakeholders as early as last June. Beginning such a process several months later seems indeed not to be rushing things.

Thank you, Mr. President.