By Walter Hoffmann

On April 20, 2006, Jan Eliasson, the president of the General Assembly will reconvene the open-ended discussion of the working group on Security Council reform. This is an opportunity for member states to present their views on the development of this debate since their last meeting in November, 2005. In his introduction, Jan Eliasson, should encourage governments to discuss alternative models put forward by independent groups. The Model Duo is an alternative model, under which governments would seek a two-country slate election to occupy one seat at the Security Council and would by exchanging diplomats share a longer six-year term.

Until now the majority of states have rejected the continental groupings proposed by the High Level Panel and have been determined to retain the electoral groupings mandated by 1965 General Assembly resolution. The problem for U.N. diplomats is how to devise a suitable apportionment of seats to the leading states in each electoral region that will satisfy the member states. As each electoral region is unique, it may be necessary to be flexible and apply different concepts for each region.

In 1992, Professor Louis Sohn, former president of the American Society of International Law, suggested the concept of “Dual Seating”. Under that concept, two states would be named to the same seat and would consult each other on all issues that come before the council during their term. The ambassadors of each state would take turns sitting in the council chair and casting the vote every other year during the term. Brazil and Argentina have carried out this concept to some extent during their recent two-year terms.

The Model Duo discussed in this paper, builds on the concept of dual seating and expands the council from 15 to 21 members. By assigning two separate non-contiguous six-year terms to the electoral regions, more regional powers could be accommodated. That is important for three reasons: 1) It strengthens the support in each region for the resolutions adopted by the Security Council, thereby making the Security Council more effective. 2) It increases the number of states participating in council decisions, thereby making the council more representative. 3) It may allow the inclusion of the powers in each region that contribute most to the United Nations financially and militarily and also can represent the more populous state in each region.

By way of example for discussion purposes only, the following is a possible scenario of expansion according to the dual seating model:

In East Asia, Japan can run for a six-year term alone, since it is the second largest contributor to the U.N. budget. For the remaining six year term in East Asia, the Republic of Korea and the Philippines could team up for a shared council seat. In South Asia, a six-year term could be shared by India and Indonesia, or later Pakistan and Bangladesh could exchange diplomats. In Latin America, Brazil and Argentina could run for the first six-year term; Mexico and Colombia could run for the second six-year term. In Western Europe and Other States, the first six-year term could be shared by Germany and Italy; the second six-year term could be shared by Canada and Australia. In Eastern Europe, the first six-year term could be occupied by Ukraine and Poland, and the second six-year term could be shared by Czech Republic and Romania. In Africa, Nigeria and South Africa or later Egypt and Algeria could each pair for shared six-year seats. This model would allow the representation of 24 different countries in two six-year terms (over a period of 12 years).

Despite the provision for two separate non-contiguous shared six-year terms, the important Charter amendment required is to increase the Security Council from 15 to 21 members. The shared six-year terms would not affect the ten two-year non-renewable terms, which would continue to be elected by the current electoral groups as at present (five each year for a two-year non-renewable term).

The concept of dual seating may be a way to break the apparent impasse blocking Security Council reform. The big advantage of dual seating is that it gives many more medium-sized regional powers the opportunity to share a longer term seat instead of having to wait their state’s turn for a two year seat which they may never get. It also offers an incentive for countries to seek regional partners, pool resources, and work together. The result can make the council more representative without compromising its effectiveness.

Mr. Hoffmann is an adjunct Professor at Ramapo College of New Jersey and is currently President of the Center’s Board. The views expressed in this publication are the opinions of the author alone and do not reflect the views of the Center Board or Ramapo College. Ayca Ariyoruk contributed to this paper.